ACCOUNTING for more than 90% of total rail passenger-km in the Netherlands, including inter-city (IC) and stopping Sprinter services, the Main Line Network (HLN) concession has always been directly awarded to Netherlands Railways (NS) with the latest agreement commencing in 2025 and set to expire in 2033.
However, this is at odds with the requirements of the European Union’s (EU) Fourth Railway Package to tender public service obligation (PSO) contracts and open the passenger market to competition. The European Commission (EC) considers the direct award to NS to be in violation of this directive and has filed a lawsuit against the Dutch government at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In addition, the Netherlands Federation of Mobility Companies (FMN), whose members include Arriva, Keolis, Transdev and QBuzz which operate passenger services under regional concessions awarded by competitive tender, has been fighting the monopolistic position of NS in the Dutch courts.
The Dutch government is considering various options for future passenger market regulation and is due to make its decision in early 2027. Its goal is to deliver a reliable and comprehensive domestic and cross-border passenger service, which is easy to manage, cost-effective, and attractive to passengers. An independent research study published last November is intended to serve as the basis for the future network, which must retain the same volume of train services after 2033.
The government is evaluating five broad scenarios. The first is the Open Network, comprising 35 small packages of concessions that will be primarily offered on an open-access basis and under which the concessionaire will pay a fee to the awarding authority. Packages that do not attract bidders will be offered again but in the form of a subsidised concession. The current concessions awarded by regional transport authorities will remain untouched.
The Functional option consists of one national IC package, a EuroCity package that includes cross-border services to Brussels, and six regional stopping train packages. These would be tendered by government and exist alongside regional concessions, which would be maintained under a Corridors model, where the Ministry of Infrastructure would tender four corridors comprising the main high-frequency routes and combining local and IC services.
The Integral Main Network option would retain the current HLN concession, which would be offered to the market by means of a direct award. Existing regional concessions would continue, while a sub-option under consideration would include a limited number of lines as regional concessions. The final and most ambitious proposal is to directly award a National Rail Network (LRN), which bundles the HLN concession with regional networks.
Competition and fragmentation
Central to the debate is a fundamental strategic choice: should the government continue with a regulated market based on concessions, or move towards open access?
The government says the chosen option must comply with European rules governing market access and awarding concessions, effectively ruling out LRN. However, once the strategic choice is made, the question arises as to how it will be managed. At present, concessions provide operators with significant protection against competition - an interim evaluation usually takes place 10-15 years into the concession while performance requirements are usually adjusted annually.
The government assumes that in an open market situation a different or at least modified system will be needed for the organisation, management, and coordination of the sector. However, the government fears fragmentation and lack of transparency over journey options, as well as a lack of cohesion between train services and their different operators. The government also does not say whether the tendering authority should prevent possible inconvenience for passengers by means of stipulating certain conditions in the concessions.
This caution suggests that, despite the extensive review, policymakers may favour evolution rather than revolution. Critics argue that the long-standing and close relationship between the Dutch state and NS could continue to shape the outcome, as exemplified by the current HLN concession.
Changes to market structure could also have consequences for operations and systems tasks - the organisation of facilities that must be provided to operators - might have to change. As the dominant operator, NS provides travel information at stations and passenger assistance services on the basis of equal conditions for all operators. Unless the government can devise and apply an effective method to establish objective and market-based pricing for these services, market opening might offer a strategic advantage to NS.
The government plans to consult with regional transport authorities as well as passenger operators, infrastructure manager ProRail, and passenger groups as it considers these aspects ahead of making its decision in early 2027, with seven years considered sufficient to prepare and implement the new order.
But with the outcome of proceedings at the ECJ and the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal not expected before late 2027, this is out of synch with the legal timetable. For now, the Netherlands stands at a crossroads. Will the coming reforms deliver a genuinely more competitive rail market, or simply repackage existing arrangements under a new banner?
